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CHAPTER I 
THE BASIC PHIWSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY 
__ ... __ ' ... 4. '1 
* 
This chapter will confine itself to a presentation of John 
Dewey·s philosophy and will make no attempt to evaluate it. 
This task will be reserved for Chapter VII • 
• or a clear understanding of his philosophy, lt might be 
well to start by presentlng ~ picture of -classloal- philo-
sophy and the oharacter of its shortcomings as he conceives 
them. He argues that this philosophy was the aCCidental out-
come of the antecedent experiences of primitive man in trying 
to adjust himself to a world of alien forces. !hese anteoe-
dent forces beoame fixed in W1ths and religious praotioes whioh 
were then later transformed by the Greeks into the 10gioa1 forma 
of philosophy, creating the two oategories of Kind and MAtter, 
!heory and Praotioe, 
• 
Primitive man who lived in a world of peril sought secur-
ity in two ways: (1) By inventing arts - PRACTICE. He made 
utensils and tools, built shelter, wove garments, used fire, 
planted fields, established associated life, etc. (2) By pro-
pi tiating the powers whioh surrounded him - !H&ORY. He made 
supplioations, offered sacrifioe, performed ceremonial rites, 
engaged in maglc cults. eto. 
Slnce practloe dealt wlth the ordlnary and theory wlth the 
extraordinary, praotioe was felt to be tnferlor to theory. 
PRACTICE 
Thought is uncertain as judgment and belief 1n matters of 
action and oan never atta1n more than a precarious probabi11ty. 
It deals w1th individualized and unique sltuations whioh In-
volve ohange. 1n Whioh the plans of man are subjeot to frus-
tration by alien foroes. 
THEORY 
!hought deals w1th oertainty; for through thought lt was 
oonsid •• ed posslble to hope for self-transcendency ln the grasp 
of universal Be1ng and thus have the oonsolatlon of certa1nty 
whioh 1s not entangled with wavering fortunes of the overt aot. 
In the early history of man this assurance was provlded by 
myths and rellgious beliefs. 
Phl10soPDT, as a Greek oreation, inherited this realm 
whioh iellglon and lfyths had been conoern:ed wlth ,and the form 
oeased to be that of the story told ln imag1native and emo-
t10nal style and became that of ratlonal disoourse oDservable 
to the canons of 10glc. the geometry of Buolld doubtlessly' 
gave the ,Greeks thelr c lew to 10g10. !hls' along wl th the 
elimlnatlon of grosser auperstitions made posslble the ldeaa 
of aolenoe and a llfe of reason. this attltude f1xed the 
oonceptlon of the two o.~.goeles of reallty - ohange and flxed 
~~ 
--------------------------------------------. 
reallty. 
1. !HE~~,_~~ PRACTICAL ACTIVITY (Change) is empirleal, par-
- . 
tlcular, materlal, probable, and contingent; in which practical , . 
I: judgment attempts an understanding to deal wlth an inferior 
region of belng in Which change rules and in which the resultlng 
product is only BELrEr and the most that oan be asserted is 
that things are "so and so· upon the whole, usually. 
2. THE REALM OF TRUE BEING (Fixed Reallty) is thought, univer-
sal, immaterlal, certain, and self-sufflcient; in which the 
office of knowledge is concerned with the disclosure of the Reali 
ln itself, of Being in and of itself. and produoe.KNOVlI.EmE 
J 
Which to be certain must relate to that Which has antecedent 
existence or essent1al Belng.,What is known 1s antecedent to 
the mental act of observat10n and inqu1ry. 
In th1s manner Greek ph110sop~ f1xed the bas1c pattern of 
man's quest for c erta1nty through knowledge. 
"the perfect and complete is rational thought, the 
ultimate ·end" or terminus of all natural movement. 
!hat which changes, which becomes and passes away. 
is material; change defines the physical. At most 
and beat, it 1s a potentiality of r.aohing a stable 
and fixed end. !o these two realms belong two 
sorts of knowledge. One of them i8 alone knowledge 
in the full sense, sOience. this has a rational, 
neoessary and unchanging for~. It is oertain. 
!he oth.r, dealing with change is belief or opin1on; 
empirical and partioular; lt 1s cont1ngent, a matter 
of probab1lity, not of o.rta1nty •••• • 1. 
1. »ewey; !he Quest for Oertaintl •. p. 20. 
~~----------------------------------------~ 
-This frcllIleviOrk of philosophic thought later became embedded in 
Christian Theology and through revelation and reason, formed 
the basic pattern for philosophic thought until the scientific 
revolution of the 17th centur.y. It is said that one can find 
in Greek philosophical efforts the embryonic character of all 
modern patterns of philosophioal thought. But aside from such 
a faot it can be said that the abiding Greek philosophy of a 
more enduring and persistent charaoter was that of Plato and 
Aristotle, in whioh there was a division of mind and matter. 
theory and praotice, an inferior order and a superior order, a 
lower and a higher reality, knowledge and belief, change and 
permanency, knowledge and aotion. It was this organization 
with whioh John Dewey finds fault and whioh the scientific re-
volution oame into conflict with. 
THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 
(What it was and what its effects were on philosophy) 
The soientific revolution of the 17th oentury effected a 
great modifioation of this system of olassioal philosophy by 
carrying the scheme of demonstrative knowledge through mathe-
matics over to natural objects which gave it a validity that 
produced a rivalry between spiritual values, guaranteed by the 
older philosophies, and the conclusions of natural soience. 
A mathematical science of nature couched in mechanistic terms 
claimed to be the only sound natural philosophy. 
~~~----------------------~----------~ 
"The work 6f Galileo was not a development, but s 
revolution. It marked a change from the qualitative 
to thequantit*tive or metrio; from the heterogene-
ous to the homogeneous; from intrinsic forms to 
relations; from esthetic harmonies to mathematical 
formulae; from contemplative enjoyment to active 
manipulation and control; from rest to change; from 
eternal objects to temporal sequence. The idea of 
a two-realm scheme persisted for moral and· religious 
purposes; it vanished for purposes of natural soi-
ence." 2. 
Bence the older philosophies lost alliance with the natural 
knowledge and support that had been given to philosophy by them. 
Philosopn, then made an effort to solve this conflict o~ in-
terests by a succession of theories regarding the nature of 
knowledge, some of which are as follows: 
SPINOZA 
Be thought to obtain from science a conclusive demonstra-
tion of the perfection of Belng. Nature was to be one with 
mind. There was in his philosophi a complete interdependence 
of all things according to universal and necessary law-~an idea 
which he found to be the basis of natural science 3. and the 
goodness of Nature was attributed to God. 
r 
fhe experimental trend of SCience, as distinct from its 
mathematical strain; was in conflict with Spinozs's unques-
tioned faith that the logioal order and oonneotion of ideas is 
one with the order and connection of existence. The same 
weakness would hold in the case of the philosophy of DESCARTES 
2 • .!lli. p. 95. 
i. !!!!!" pp. 54 & 65. 
---------------------------------------------------------------, ~o attempted to find the locus of absolute oertainty in math-
ematical terms within the knowing mind. 
~ 
!he philosopbT of Kant was a further attempt to reconcile 
the idea that the realm of ends and values authoritative for 
conduct was that of the revealed will of God; and in which the 
olaims of reason are supreme with that of the knowledge of 
nature. )'or this purpose he made a two-fold division of terri-
tor.y between the objects of cognitive certainty and those of 
equally complete moral assurance. Hls failure was to 80 show 
successfully how these two fields could have a natural basis 
of contact and interaotion~ 
HERBERT SPENCER 
Ris doctrine that universal evolution is the highest principle 
of the physical world-is just another phase in seeking cer-
tainty - Good in reality - towards whiohthe evolution is 
moving. 
John Dewey oites the theories of these philosophers, among 
others, to show that oonfliot and oonfusion are the inevitable 
results of the division .ofthe world, into two kinds· of Being, 
one superior, aooessible only to reason and ideal in nature, 
the other inferior, material, ohangeable, accessib.le to sense 
observationa. In the former oase knowledge is contemplative 
and in the latter it is operative. this situation as the re-
sult of an historical acoident has led philosophy into end-
les8 oonfusion and fruitless aotivity, 8S well as an .mpasse 
· GoaDeotlon with the modern findings of acienoe.' '0 re-
.•• ~.ilish itself philosophy must reoonstruct itself on the 
,asis of rationalizing the possibilities of experience; in 
other words it must become operative and experimental. 
~'he division of the world into two kinds of Being. 
one superior, acoessible only to reason and ideal 
in nature, the other inferior. material, change-
able, empirical, acoessible to sense-observation, 
turns inevitably into the idea that knowledge is 
oontemplative in nature. It assumes a contrast 
between theory and practioe which was all to the 
dlsadvantage of the latter. But in the ,aotual 
oourse of the development of sOienoe, a tremendous 
change has come about. When the praotice of know-
ledge oeased to be dialeotioal and became experi. 
mental, knowing became pre-occupied with changes 
and the test of knowledge became the ability to 
bring about certain ohanges. Knowing, for the 
experimental scienoes, means a certain kind of 
intelligently oonduoted doing; it oeases to be 
oontemplative and beoomes in a true sense prao-
tioal. Bow this implies that philosophy, unless 
it is to undergo a oomplete break with the auth-
orized spirit of sOience, must also alter its 
nature. It must assume a praotioal nature; it 
must become operative and expertmental.-*-
~hilosophioally speaking, this is the great dif-
ferenoe involved in the ohange from knowledge and 
philosophy as oontemplative to.pperative. !he 
ohange does not mean the lowers'in dignity of 
philosophy from a lofty plane to one of gross 
utilitarianism. It signifies that the prime func-
tion of philosophy ls that of rationalizing the 
pOssibilities of experience, espeoiallf oolleotive 
human experience." 4. 
Iewton claimed to have arrived at his sOience empirio ally , 
but being influenced by the intellectual oonceptions of olassi-
oal philosophy, he postulated mass, time, spaoe, and motion a8 
absolutes. He arrived at this position of establiShing these 
• Dewey; Reoonstruction in Philosopbl, p. 122. 
. ...,iservables by means of rea·s:on'iD.g from observable data and 
not by methods in keeping with experimental science. 
As a consequence, Binstein. in looking for a hypothesis 
~o explain the empirical results of the )(J.chelson-Korley exper-
iment on light, undermined Newton's position in regard to ab-
solutes. the discovery of the Heisenberg's principle of "in-
determinancy" further weakened the possibility of Science 
d.aling with unchangeable substance having properties fixed in 
isolation and unaffected by interaction. 
~eisenberg's principle compels a recognition of the 
fact that interaotion prevents an aocurate measure-
ment of velocity and position for anl body. the demonstration oentering about the 1'0 e of the inter-
action of the observer in determining what actually 
happens." 5. 
~8 showed that if we fix, metrically, velocity, then 
the~e is a range of indeterminateness in the assign-
ment of position, and vice-versa. When one is fixed 
the other is defined only within a specified limit 
of probability. The element of indeterminateness is 
not connected with defect in the method of observa-
tion but is intrinsic." 6. 
Ihe importance for John Dewey of these two advances of scient!f 
~eor.r, is that they show in science at least. that the idea of 
aisolutes in classical philosophy cannot be the objects of 
,-
moWing. Science on the ,o-th-er hand makes progress through know-
tng the operations of fixed relations in the element of change 
1a phenomena. 
It has accomplished this by not studying things in their 
~ualitative" aspects but by reducing them to !!!! and 
, Dtd, p. 202. 
I. Iiid p 203 
-,. . 
rr 
, ~onsiderins tht:nji •• termini of natural "events." 
"by 'data' 18 slgnified subject-matter for fur-
ther interpretation; something to be thought 
about. Objects are finalitles; the,y are complete, 
finished; they oall for thought only in the way 
of definltion, classifioation, 10glcal arrange-
ments, eto.'" 7. 
-Water as all. object of sCience, as H20 wlth all 
the other soientlfio propositions whIch can be 
made about it, is not a rival for positlon in 
real being with the water we see and use. It Is, 
because of experlmental operations, all. added In-
strumentaltty of multiplied controls and uses of 
the real things of everyday experienoes." 8. 
Knowing in. this case becomes a matter of control of operations 
for the sake of achieving events. Knowing is experimental and 
is 'a matter· of control of consequences all. the basis of control 
over known operations in Which knowing is a partiCipation in 
the situation finally produced. In short it is instrumental 
and Within nature. These two words, instrumental and within 
nature are very important in locating the nature of John 
Dewey's philosopby'. Instrumental indicates that knowing is 
the means for promoting growth and not flnal values. And ~ 
Within nature - explains his effort to confine What is know-
able to man and the operations of man in his mental operations, 
to a natural, and not a supernatural agenoy. ~or John Dewey, 
life Is the problem of all. organism in relation to all. environ-
ment in whioh it must maintain a suocessful adjustment • 
• ailure to do so means extinction. Therefore, what is worth 
7. Dewey; The Quest for Certainty, p. 99. 
8. !2!!, p. 106. 
-knowing for man are those relations whioh will enable him to 
survive and to grow in the oapacity of giving greater meaning 
and therefore greater success to the process. 
~oWlng is seen to be a partioipant in what is 
.finally known. Iloreover. the metapqsios of ex-
istenoe as something fixed and therefore oapable 
of literally exaot mathematioal description and 
prediction is undermined. Knowing ia, for phil-
osophical theory, a case of speoially directed 
aotivity instead of something isolated from prac-
tioe. !he quest for oertainty by means of exaot 
possession in mind'of immutable reality is ex-
ohanged for searoh for seourity by means of aotive 
oontrol of the ohanging oourse of events. Intel-
lig$noe in operation, another name for method, be-' 
oomes the thing most worth winning." 9. 
Prom this point of view "aotion" is raised to a matter of equal 
dignity and importance with thinking. for only as things are 
, . ,;. 
done,does~owledge arise. For the proof and realization of 
knowing is in the sucoessful outcome of an operation which in 
its outoome reveals new ndata"~ !his furnishes the basis for 
. .' ·':fI.· . 
new operations and newoontrols, values and meanings. As has 
been pOinted out, this conception of knowledge discounts the 
need for absolutes and univ.ersals .. represented partially in 
things, whioh the mind in its operation mustabstraot, or in 
some other manner produce. .or John Dewey. the philosophy 
whioh made that a necessity. was an unfortunate aooident of 
history as the Greek thinkers, who gave rational form to a 
quest for certainty that was antecedent in the life of the pri-
mitive man, did so before science was available as a means 
of.knowledge or oontrol. 
9. Ib~d, p. 204. 
II"'" 
--------------------------------------------. 
Disoounting 'he values outside of nature, whioh aooording 
to Dewey were merelT the produot of the fallacious formulation 
of the problem of knowing of cla8sioal philosophy, he is faced 
with the task of showing how sensation, perception, thinking, 
logic, ideas, univ~,rsals, values, and meanings, etc. are pos-
sible in the realm of "experience,"as exemplified by the 
methods of science in the realm of nature with no relianee,con-
nection or obligations to the supernatural. )lor him, knowing 
which operates wi thin nature in sCience, has proven itself as 
the only kind of knowing possible to man because it has proven 
the impossibility of knOWing absolutes in science 'as postulated 
by classical ph.ilosophy. By this act of upsetting the theory 
of absolutes' in so ience. '~t' disoounts the theory of absolutes 
in general, and therefore, 'th'e only valid kind of knowledge 
for man is that Which he has' about operations within nature. 
To follow his explanation of this kind of knowing, we will 
have to start with his desorip,tion of what "experienoe" is. 
":&xperienoe" is an undertaking ,that transforms a problematic 
situation into a resolved one. Only the individual things 
Whioh are the fruits of intelligent action have in them in-
trinsic order ,and fullness of qualities. 
"We have an experience when the material experienced 
runs its course to fulfillment. Then and only then 
is it integrated within and demarcated in the gen-
eral stream of experience from other experience. A 
pieoe of work is finished in a way that is satis-
faotory; a problem receives ita solution; a game i. 
played through; a situation, whether that of eating 
a meal, playing a game of chess, carrying on a 
~------------------------------------------------------, ~ 
oonvGraation. writing a book, or-taking part in a 
»olitioal camp.lgn, is so rounded out that its 
olose is a oonsummation and not a oessation. SUch 
an experience ' is a whole and carried with it its 
own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. 
It is an experience.- 10. 
John Dewey resolves his problem of "experienoe" within na-
ture, as the basis of knowledge and aotion, by stating that 
mind and matter are two aspects of behavior instead of being 
identified as two separate categories which must in some manner 
breach the gap between themselves. He feels that the separa-
tion between mind and matter is unnecessary and the reason he 
advances for his opinions is best expressed in his own words. 
"I think that the habit of regarding the mental 
and physioal as separate things has its roots in 
regarding them as substances or processes instead 
of functions and qualities of aotion." 11. 
Having established the fact that mind and matter are but 
two aspects of behavior in nature, as stimulus - response of 
"experience," it becomes neoessary for him to explain how all 
the operations of a rational being are but modes of this phen-
omenon. 
Katter is not an entity. It is the character of a na-
tural event in its sequential order 12. and lUND expresses the 
-
. 
charaoter of a natural event in its meanings and its logioal 
conneotions and dependencies. It is an organized system of 
IC·Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 35. 
11.Dewey, PhilosoPhl and Civilization, p. 302. 
l2.Dewey, Experience and Bature, p. 73. 
*mean1ng of whioh OOli"SOIOUSNESI.is the immediate awareness of 
*meaning. 
nThere is an obvious difference between mind and 
oonsoiousness; meaning and idea. Kind denotes 
the whole 8.1stem of meanings as they are embodied 
in the workings of organic life; consciousness in 
a b.lng With language denotes an awareness or per-
oeption of meanings; it is the peroeption of aotual 
events, whether past, contemporar,y or future, in 
their meanings, the havlng of aotual id.as •••• lnd 
ls oontextual and persistent; oonsoiousness is 
focal and transitive. n 13. 
SENSATION 
John Dewey holds that sensations are not parts of any 
knowledge but are merely the stimull for an aot of inquiry 
which will bring about an adjustment with the environment. 
They are merely stimuli to refleotion and inferenc •• 14. 
PERCEPTION 
Perc eption furnishes the pro"blem for knowing by refering 
the present to its oonsequences. It is something to be known 
not an objeot of knowledge. It seleots from the mass of pre-
sented qualities those whioh throw light on the nature of the 
problem with a view to making them the basis of the problematio 
situation. 15., li. 
Imagination is the gateway through which meamiBgs derived 
from previous experiences enter into a relation with the 
*The term meaning as used in this context will be fully' ex-
plained later. 
13. Ibld, p. 303. 
14. 15e .. ey; !he Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp.68,89-90. 
15. Dewey; Jxperienoe and Bature, p. IS2. 
16. Dewey; 'he Quest for dertainty, p. 90. 
~--------------------------------------------------------------I ~ 
present s1tuation. It 1s also the method by which an enaot-
ment of the meane - oonsequences can be tried out without the 
organism getting involved in any overt action. 17., 18. 
INTUITION 
To explain this phenomenon, ~ewey establishes a field of 
·organic activities and receptivities" Which are natural to the 
organism and which are subconscious in their charaoter, but 
which unconsciously give us the "immediate qualitative feel-
of rightness or wrongness about our conscious seleotions of 
data and meanings to be used in sucoessfully resolving our 
problems. Between the purely suboonsoious operation of these 
organic activities, and our consoious field of operation is a 
meeting ground of the two, oalled the "fringe- Whioh is the 
field of operation of intuition. 
-Apart from language, from imputed and inferred 
meaning, we oontinually engage in an immense 
multitude of immediate orfanic selections, rejec-
tions, weloomlngs, expuls ons, appropriations, 
withdrawals, shrinkings, expansions, elations, 
and dejeotions, attaoks, wardings off, of the most 
minute, vibratingly delioate nature. We are not 
aware of the qualities of many of or most of these 
aots; we do not objectively distinguish and identify 
them. Yet they exist as feelings and qualities and 
have enormous direotive effeot on our behavior. 
If, for example, oertain sensory qualities of whioh 
we are not oognitively aware oease to exist, We 
oannot stand or oontrol our posture and movements. 
In a thoroughlY normal organism. these -feelings" 
have an effioienoy of operation Whioh it is im-
possible for thought to match. Iven our most 
highly intelleotualized operations depend upon 
them as a "fringe" by whioh to guide our inferential 
~7. Dewey; Art as Experienoe, p. 272. 
18. Dewey; Experience and Nature, p. 29. 
,.," --------------------~--------------------------------------------, 
movements. ~., give us our sense of right-
ness or wrongn.ss •••• Formulat6d discourse is 
mainly but a selected statement of what we wish 
to retain among all these inCipient starts, fol-
lowed by ups and breaking off.--These qualities 
are the stuff of "intuitions" and in actuality 
the difference between an intuitive and an anal-
ytical person is at most a matter of degree of 
relative emphasis. The "reasoning" person is one 
who makes hi$ "1ntui tions" more articulate, more 
deliverable in speech as explicit sequence of 
initial premises, jointures. and conclusions." 19. 
RlSFIECTIO.N 
" 
Reflection in John Dewey's theory is not a goiDg back to 
an earlier more certain form of knowledge. It is not an "iden-
tification" with something else that is known immediately or 
intuitivelY. It is rather consulting what is already known to 
get our bearings in a new situation, the outcome of which. as 
in the ease of the Michelson-Korley experiment, may be something 
which causes men to revise what they thought they previously 
knew. This was the case in the experimental discovery that 
the velocity of light remains the same when measured either 
with or against the direction of the earth's surfaoe. It is 
essential for the construction of a hypothesis which will re-
sult in s successful resolution of a problematic situation. 20. 
MEMORY 
Memory is our awareness of the values and meanings con-
tS,ined in our past experiences. 21. 
19. Ibid. pp. 299-300. 
20. Dewey; The Quest for Certaint,' pp. 170-194. 
21. Dewey; Art as Experience, p. 1. 
-mT~LLIGENCE! JUIUDNTS, aDd REASON 
-
Inte11igenoe is the capaoity to estimate ,the possibilities 
of a situation aDd to act in acoordance with this, estimate. 
It involves the seleotion and arrangement of means to effect 
consequences and with a choice of what we take as our ends. 
Whenever intelligence operates, things are judged in their 
capacity of signs of other things. It oonsists in grasping 
relationships. 22. 
Beason is experimental intelligence, conceived after the . 
pattern of science. 23. 
MEANIlG-IDEAS-THOUGHT 
It is also advisable to treat these three items together be-
cause of the olose interrelation of their operations. In faot 
they are merely ways of designating how natute operates; the 
operation being one interrelated Whole of whioh the various 
names we give to oertain phases of the operation merely brings 
into relief certain elements that we wish to observe more 
closely, like the "close-ups" in a moving picture. According 
to Dewe.r we cannot mark off certain operations in nature to 
give them existential oharacter of distinct individuality with-
out falling into the error of forming the rigid categories of 
classical philosophy whioh distinguished certain operations as 
belonging to matter and change, and certain others as be-
longing to mind and permanency. 
22. Dewey; ~he Quest for UertaintI, p. 213. 
23. Dewey; Reoonstruction in PhiloaoPhl,p. 5. 
.eaning is a method of action as a means to a ~hared 
consummation that two people and an object can have in oommon. 
It is something that becomes a property of behavior, and sec-
ondarily a property of objects. It constitutes the intelligi-
bility of acts and things. 
"!hus every meaning is generic or universal. It 
is something oommon between speaker, hearer, and 
the thing to which speech refers. It is univer-
sal also as a means of generalization. Por a 
meaning is a method of action, a way of using things 
as means to a shared consummation, and method is 
general, though the things to which it is applied 
are particular. The meaning, for example of 
portability is something in Which two persons and 
an objeot share. But portability after it is once 
apprehended beoomes a way of treating other things; 
it is extended widely. Whenever this is a ohanee 
it is applied; applioation ceases only when a 
thing refuses to be treated in this way ••• 
It would be difficult to imagine any doc-
trine more absurd than the theory that general 
ideas or meanings arise by the comparison of a 
number of particulars, eventuating in t~e recog-
nition of something common to them all.; Such a 
-comparison may be employed to check a suggested 
widened applioation of a rule. But generalization 
is oarried spontaneously' as far as it W1ll ao-
tually go."; A newly aoquired meaning is foroed 
upon everything that does not obviously' resist its 
application, as a child uses a new word Whenever 
he gets a chance or as he p~ays with a new toy. 
Meanings are self-moving to new oa8es. In the 
end, oonditions foroe a chastening of this spon-
taneous tendency. the soope and limits of ap-
plioation are asoertained experimentally in the 
process of applicatioB." 24. 
Meanings are possible because of "tools" which enable an aotion 
to be oarried out. In this sense language and communication 
beoome most important "tools." Man is enabled to use the 
24. ~, p. 188. 
-tool- of languag., to enaot aotion without resorting to overt 
aotion. In this manner he is able to widen the soope of the 
possibilities of his aotivity. language as symbols further 
widens man's sphere of aotion when these symbols beoome more 
exaoting in looating the more important aspects of the many 
possible meanings attaohed to a given word. !his prooess of 
refining and purifying words to a more oonfining aspeot of 
meaning is a prooess of abstraction which reaches its highest 
form of usefulness When the abstraotion reaohes a stage Where 
it is an identifying form of its own and can set up relation-
ship with other things because of its liberated state. !his 
is the oase when water is designated as H20. !he term H20 
permits a wider range of relationship with other things than 
that enjoyed by its term water. !his is basically the ex-
planation that Dewey gives for mathematical terms whioh were 
originally identifying terms for such overt action as oounting, 
keeping tally, noting transaotions, eto. When the process in-
volved reaohed the stage of abstraotion and number was the 
means of conneoting previously unrelated events and objeots, 
mathematios beoame an operation oapable of being oarried on 
apart from immediate overt aotion with a series of new re-
lationships with other events which enormously increased the 
power of man to deal with nature. 
ftfo pass over in science the human meanings of the 
oonsequences of natural interactions is legitimate; 
indeed it is indispensable. fo asoertain and state 
meanings in abstraction from ~ocial or shared situa-
tions is the only way in whioh the latter oan be 
1ntelligently modified, extended and varied. Math-
ematical s,ymbols have least connection with dis-
tinctively human situations and consequences; and 
the finding of such terms, free from esthetic and 
moral significance, is a necessary part of the 
technique. Indeed, such elimination of ulterior 
meanings supplies perhaps the best possible em-
pirical definition of mathematical relations. They 
are meanings without direct reference to human 
behavior. Thus an essence becomes Wholly "intel-
lectual" or scientific, devoid of consummatory im-
plication; it expresses the purely instrumental 
with reference to the objects to which the events 
in question are instrumental. It then becomes the 
starting point of reflection that may terminate in 
ends or consequences in huaan suffering and enjoy-
ment not previously experienced. Abstraction from 
any particular consequence (which is the same thing 
as taking instrumentality generally), opens the 
way to new uses and consequences." 25. 
UNIVERSAL 
Is a relation of means consequence which defi~es an operation 
.part from the instance in which it receives overt o'bjectifi-
cation, although its meaning is found only in that actualiza-
tion. 26. 
BSSImCBS 
"Essence is never existence. It is the distilled import of 
existence. In it, feeling and understanding are one." 27. 
It is the meaning which has extensive and recurrent conse-
quences. When potential consequences are important and re-
peated they form its defining and identifying form. 28. 
25. Ibid, pp. 191-192. 
26. Dewey; The Quest for Oertainty, p. 163. 
27. 28. Dewey; Experience and Nature, p. 182 • 
.,n 
""" __ ----------------------------------------------1 - """ IDEAS 
-
Consoiousness may be oonsidered the operation and "ideas" 
the result of that operation. They are the result of the grasp 
of meaning in its state of re-direotion, re-adaptatlon or re-
organization in the prooess of thinking. An Idea is the !!a-
nlfying of a meaning by bringing to a sharp focal form a mean-
ing as a part of the whole oontext of meaning - whioh is Mind. 
It is the prooess of attending to a partioular meaning. 
THOUGHT 
Thought is a mode of direct overt aotion in whioh the pro-
blematio situation has been oarried over into a resolved one. 
It is no; a speoifio power but oonsists of the procedures ~­
tentionalll employed to resolve a problem. It is by this very 
nature, experimental. 
"Thought and reason are not speoifio rowers. They 
consist of the prooedures intentional~y employed in 
the application to eaoh other of the unsatisfaotorily 
oonfused and indeterminate on one side and the re-
gular and stable on the other. Generalizing from 
such observation, empirical philosophY perceives 
that thinking is a oontinuous prooess of temporal 
re-organization within one and the same world of 
experienced things, not a jump from the latter 
world into one of obJeots, constituted once for all 
by thought." 29. 
~ut the constructive office of thought is empirioal--
that is. experimental. "Thought" is not a property 
of something termed intelleot or reason apart from 
nature. It is a mode of direoted overt aotion. 
Ideas are antioipatory plans and designs whioh take 
effect in oonorete reoonstruotions of the anteoedent 
oonditions of existence." 30. 
29. !!!!!,pp. 67 -68. 
30. Dewey; The Quest for Certainty. p. 167. 
Mathematics __ an operation of reasoning has long been 
pointed to as proof of the existence of a speoia1 property 
oa11ed mind beoause it was able to carry on its operations with 
out any seeming relation to material things for its develop-
ment. This seemed to be self-evident proof of the fact that 
man as a reasoning animal had the capaoity of an operation that 
was not material in its charaoter and therefore spiritual in 
its nature. This diVision into oategories of Mind and Matter 
is what Dewey calls the "illusion" of classical philosophy 
and he takes the occasion in his discussion of logic to show 
that mathematical logic is an operation entirely within nature. 
having its dependencies on overt action, or to state it 
another way, through -experience," as he has defined "ex-
perience •. " It will be well at this point to let John Dewey 
speak for himself. 
-The distinction between p)lysica1 and mathematical 
conception may be brought out by noting an ambi-
guity in the term -possible." Any idea as suoh des-
ignates an operation that may be performed. not 
something in aotua1 existenoe. The idea of the 
aweetness of, say. sugar, is an indiOitfon'of the 
consequenees of a possible operation of tasting. 
as distinct from a directly experienced quality. 
Xathematica1 ideas are designations of 
pOSsible operations in another and secondary sense 
previously expressed in speaking of the possibi1tty 
of symbolic operatiOns with respect to one another. 
This sense of possibility is compossibility (able 
to exist together) of operations, not possibility 
of performance with respect to existence ••• lts 
"DOn-tncompatibi1ity" (unopposed in character) 
indicates that all developments are welcome as 
long as they do not c·onf1iot with one another, or 
as long as restatement of an operation prevents 
aotua1 oonf1iot. It may be cqmposed with natural 
seleotion, which is a principle of elimination but 
not one of controlling positive development." 31. 
EMOTION 
Emotion is the resulting condition of responsive behavior 
in its immediate quality, when we are confronted with the pre-
carious as a problem to be resolved. It marks off the even 
tenor of existence when it is uncertain of the present situa-
tion in regard to its issue. 32. 
KNoWLEDGE 
It is inevitably clear from the presentation of the previous 
material, what the nature of "knowledge" is in John Dewey's 
philosophy. It is the outoome of "experienoe," which is the 
experimental method applied to problems which arise from the 
necessary adjustment that an organism, endowed with reason, 
has to make with its environment. SCience made its progress 
by being able to establish control of results by its knowledge, 
not of things as such, but of established relationships in the 
elements of change in phenomena. the advanoe in soienoe which 
discredited :Newtonls physios beoause it postulated "sub-
stanoes" as time, matter, and space and motion, along with the 
theory of indeterminancy of Heisenberg, makes it clear to 
John Dewey that the theory of absolutes has to be abandoned; 
and the only thing that man can know are the fixed relations 
of ohange, and that this knowledge is one of growth gained 
31. laid, pp. 159-160. 
32. J.lewey. Bxperienc e and Nature, p. 390. 
with the result that all values in the moral, social and reli-
gious field are suaject to guidanoe, growth, and development 
through the use of the experimental method in oonjunction with 
the higher aspirations, ideals and hopes of man. Purther,all 
the operations of mind and the higher aspirations, ideals, and 
hopes of man are within nature. They are phases of nature 
similar to that of physical phenomena, but on a higher plane. 
~opes and fears, desires and aversions, are as 
truly responses to things as are knowing and think-
ing. Our affeotions, when they are enlightened by 
understanding, are organs by whioh we enter into 
the meaning of the natural world as genuinely as 
by knowing, and with greater fullness and inti-
maoy. !his deeper and rioher interoourse with 
things can be effeoted only by thought and its 
resultant knowledge; the arts in w~ich the poten-
tial meanings of nature are realized demand an 
intermediate and transitional phase of detachment 
and abstraotion. The colder and less int, .. t8u 
transaotions of knowing involve temporary disregard 
of the qualities and values to which our affeotions 
and enjoyments are attached. But knowledge is an 
indispensable medium of our hopes and fears, of 
loves and hates, 1f desires and preferences are to 
be steady, ordered, charged with meaning, secure.- 35. 
-Affections. desires. purposes, choioes are going 
to endure as long as man is man; therefore as long 
as man 1s man, there are going to be ideas, judg-
ments, beliefs about values. Bothing could be 
sillier than to attempt to justify their exist-
ence at large; they are going to exist anyway. 
What is inev1tab1e needs no proof for its existence. 
BUt these expressions of our nature need direotion, 
and direotion is possible only through knowledge. 1 36. 
36. ~, p. 297~ 
36. Ibid, p. 299. 
" 
Being intellectually honest John Dewey must accept the inevi-
table conclusions of his philosophY of ttexperience," Whioh 
finds all human acts and destiny within nature. !his makes it 
necessary for him to deny the supernatural character of reli-
gion and therefore to 'deny the idea of God. Religion for him 
becomes that character of "experience" which is the contempla-
tion of the consummation of our process of knowing with our 
higher aspirations and ideals. 
"Understanding and knowledge also enter into a 
perspective that is religious in quality. Faith 
in the continued disclosing of truth through dir-
ected cooperative human endeavor is more reli-
gious in quality than is any faith in a com-
pleted revelation ••• But faith in the possibilities 
of continued and rigorous •••• !here is such a 
thing as faith in intelligence becoming religious 
in quality." 37. 
!he chief purpose in making this short, but I hope oomp1ete, 
survey of John Dewey's philosophy is to furnish the baokground 
for evaluating his philosophy of Art. !his survey has dis-
olosed, I am sure, that ~xperience" is the occasion for all 
human values, and in which therefore his explanation of Art 
must be looked for. 
37. Dewey; !he Common Faith. p. 26; 
CBAPTIm II 
!HE BASIC PHILOSOPHY OF JACQUES MARITAIB 
_____ .. ____ Jm_ ....... __ .......... II •• "'" IJ .... ~ 
* 
Jaoques Marltain ls a follower of the philosop~ of St. !homas 
Aqulnas and so the task of this chapter will be to present the 
broad out11nes of St. thomas Aquinas' philosop~. Slnce hls 
phl1osophy, unllke that of John Dewey's. follows a ·olassloal" 
pattern lt might be sufficient to present lt in chart form with 
some remarks ln summatlon rather than to present it ln essay 
form. 
• 
GOD 
!here is proof of the existence of God. CS. !., I., q. 2, a. 2) 
HI ls the 
FIRST CAUSE AND FINAL CAUSB 
(8. ! •• I. Q. 1. a. 2) 
GOD'S wlll the cause of thlngs 
CS. ! •• I., q. 19, a. 4) 
:four Causes 
1. :flnal Cause 
2. ~ormal Caus. 
3. Bfflclent Cause 
4. Material Cause 
BE Crea1led 
(8. f •• I •• q. 90~ a. 2) 
Pr1me Mat'er (Po'ent1a11ty) 301ned to certa1n forms (ACT) _ 
result1ng 1n a h1erarcn, 1n nature 
(S. t •• I •• q. 18. a. 1, ad 2um) 
1. 1norgan10 - lack of movement 
2. l1v1ng organ1sms - vegetat1ve - movement 
3. an1mala - motor and sens1t1ve - self-movement 
4. man - motor. sens1t1ve, and 1ntellectual 
5. angels - spir1tual (acts 1ndependant of matter) 
BODY 
mater1al 
• 
composed of 
and SOUL 
(S. f •• I., q. 75, a. 3) sp1r1tual-the f1rst pr1nciple of 11fe CS. f., I •• q. 75, a. 1) 
w1th oerta1n 
POWERS OF THE SOUL (a: !., I., 2. 77. a. 1=4) 
I. IBTELLBCfUAL 
(~ !.~ It q. 79,a. 1-18) 
II. APPETITIVE 
(S. T. , I., q. 80. a. 1-2) 
SEBSITIVE II TELLECTUAL 
(S. f •• I. t t.. 811 a. 1-3)' (8. ! •• I •• q. 82. a. 1-5) Irasoible ooncup1so1ble 
(S.! •• I-II, q. 23, a. 1-4) WILL 
Pass10ns of 
FREE-WILL (a.T., I., q. as, a. 1-4) 
1. Love and Hatred 1. Hope and Despa1r 
2. Des1re and Avers10n 2. li'ear and Dar1ng 
3. Pleasure and aadnesa 3. Anger (S. !., I-II. q. 25, a. 4) 
• 
HOW !HI IBTELI.J5CTUAL POORS OPERATI 
ln the 
1. PRAOT leAL ORDIR (s. T. e I., q. 79, a. 11) (for the sake of something e1s8) 
liAISING (Arta) ..A.CTlOlL (Mora11ty ) 
WhAt reason eatab11shes 
ln the aot of our Wl11 
ln the use of our .reedom 
(S. !., I., q. 79, a.11) 
ultimate end ls the flrst princlp1e 
What reason estab11shes 1n 
erterna1 th1nss (S. !., I., q. 79, a. 111 
the 
ln practical matters (S. T., I., q. 1, a. 2) 
2. SPECUIA.TIVB OBDER (for Its own aake) 
(8. T., I., q. 79, a. 1) 
Kinds of Knowlng (S.!., I., q. 79, a. 1) 
1. .alth: assent to Truth as revealed by God (a. f •• II-ll,q.8) 
2. Uijderstandlns: a glft of supernatural 11ght and ls the 
lmmedlate grasp of f~th (8. T., I., q. 79, a. 9. ad 4um) 
3. SolellOe:, Whloh produoes knowledge demonstratlvely by 
attrlbuting oauses (a. T., I •• q. 79, a. 9) 
Process of Knowlng (8, !., I., q. ~, a. 1-8) 
Jl1nA 
'''''''''''' .. ,_ .. ,,_ •. _----.., Sensations - pure sense 
stimulation 
__ i-' Perceptlon - recognl tlon 
. __ ---.r--Image -
Idea----
!he un1versa1 18 an aastrlotlon from ~he phantaaa (1mage) by the 
acting lntel1ect as the la.own ls ln t l1e knower aocordlng to the 
mode of the knower. there'iore, the ma~erlal object must be known 
!mmaterlalll 1n the mlnd. --_. 
1 )(emo17 
Judgment: whlch deterll1ne~ that the f ~rm apprehended 1s good. 
Beason1ng 1s a prooess of 'passilJg frol~ the known to the unDon. 
We know a thing 1n a more or le8s vague way at the 
beg1nning (general concept) and more distinctlY as 
we become more aoquainted with lt .e make it more universal 
" 1 o 
• H 
• 
• ~. 
... 
........ 
If) 
.= 
... 
BOW !11Ii APPA!IlfIV& l?C8BS OF JI.U OPERA'fB 
.. ... .... " *.- t_ •• 
SlII81~iu !OUBS 
la_lOA .. OOllpaDl.. _04111' ohaD&_ wb.lob. 
_k •• " _ .. , of 'he Seul'1"? 1'OW8" 
-
,... 
::18. 
......... 
-II IASaIO» -< -------.~ ......... --.. . (8.t..l.4..12.&.2) 
RA~UH~ . *1. 0lY'1C! 
A.· ~Q~ 
. Iba' 1t 40 •• ~ the patle.' ...... 
-... I · Ie alao 81 TeA a tOfta - LOB. !hi. foa 1a a pJ'lDOlple 01 .. \loa 1fhloh prot .... cae ~ .. .... •• 
-
__ loa ... th. pa".' ot the 
"'t"· \oWa~8 the' oal_'.. '>- *8. O.IJlCf 
, D:B8lB 
----.....;>~ lUll! (a.~ •• 1.,.83 .... 1) (a.' •• l-n.:q •• t .. a.~) 
Ia a 1_11\7 whloh 18 a. 41a-
:tH1\1- 1a the fao1l1\1' wblo11 
tae111\a, •• \he ~rtDo1pl. 1a 
• 'loa.. 
Balll'_ue for .... Dr u'a • 
Goo4 ,- .... 
Sui"'alA ~ 
...... .tva 
11e..-41eo0r4aat 
~ "".uatue (a,.~~ .. 1 .... 11 .. q.71 ••• 1.) 
l.!!l:.' 1. in the ,.. •• aloa ot 
. \he ell ,eo' (When 1004) 
8cw~ 1. 1a \he poae.aloa 
0'1 tn.eoltj .. , (WIle .. 11) 
Set 1 ... 
li~.'Wll y1"'.. '.lad_ 8;:;I-II.,.67.a.I-6) . V:adua'andbta 
y~----------------~ ( .. 1 •• 1-.11.,.11._.1-4) '_pel"aac. h"ud ... 
Iaapll .. ··a··pert .. \loaof a power. 
A "1'al halll' la a .\1t \hat OIl • 
..... ell.. 
. ... 1 YUh.. I JUst10. 
'a.:t •.• :I-Iltq~61..a~1-4) :ro.-\1'_. 
l:falth Iholo le.l. Yl.tue. Bop • ., TB;.! •• f-II.l:.,U ••• l-4) Ch ... lty' 
Anything i. knowable in so far as it i. aotua1 (ulade up of 
matter and form); that Whioh is potential in 80 far as 1t i. 
lotentia1, but not prime-matter since it is purely potential S. ! •• I., q. 14, a. 3. ad 3um) . 
Inte1leot is potentiality and is made aotual through knowing 
Intelligence is a possession of the truth not 
a prooess 
~niOl1 is belief 
wieds. is oertainty 
Issence is the definition of a thing 
-. (De Bnte et Bssentia, c. 1) 
~hi10s0Phl to understand What is immediate in experience 
in the light of first principles. 
~etaphysios philosophY whioh goes beyond all material 
oonditions. 
fheo10gy haa GOD for its subjeot matter. deals with re-
vealed truth. 
(S. f., I •• q. 1, a. 1. ad 5ua) 
Bvery agent of neoessity ~ots, for an e~. things whioh have no 
knowledge tend towards their ends as the result of their nature 
Which is as disposed. !he end of everything is its own perfeo-
tion. Bnds are principle. of human action. 
!here are two kiDds of Action, 
~~ansient Action prooeeds from agent to something outside him-
self. 
Immanent Action is for the good of the agent. 
(S. f., I, q. 5, a. 2. ad 3ua) 
GOOD (S. f •• I. q. 6. a. 6) 
1. Is that whioh everything desires and everything is good 
in so far as it is perfeot. 
2. !he Good is present in the Will a8 Knowledge 
3. truth is the same as knowledge 
4. truth i8 the only thing Whioh satisfies the intelleot. 
S. !he ultimate happiness of man is found in his inte11eot, 
and 1eaels to 
WIaDOll (i_anent aotionj (8. , •• ~., q. i, a. 6 
whioh 1s knowledge of the .irst Cause 
and is the life most proper to man since it is basioally intel-
1eotual. the ultimate happiness of man is found in his inte1-
1eot which is BEATITUDE 
U17"'! •• I, q. 3, a. 8) 
Which is the oontemp1ation of wisdom for its own sake and is the 
ultimate happiness for man as a oreature possessing rea.on. 
CHAPTER 3 
!HE PHILOSOPHY OF ART OF JOHN DE~m 
* 
Since John Dewey states that the life of man is within nature 
( 
in the form of "experience," it will be in "experience", as 
he has defined that term that his explanation of Art must be 
looked for. As stated in Ohapter I, -experience" is not just 
a matter of undergoing and reaotions, but oonsists in resolv~ 
ing a problematic situation into a sucoessful outoome. In this 
prooess man is first aware that a problem exists; seoond, he 
forms a hypothesis for the solution of the problem, and third, 
he proceeds to act on the basis of the hypothesis and then 
evaluate its outcome. In this prooess of "experience," what 
is oalled Art is a oertain oondition attending the "experience" 
and therefore, there is no fundamental differenoe between art 
and "experience." Art is a quality that permeates experience.l. 
It is in the rhythmiO movement from change to stability in ex-
perienoe whioh looates the esthetio. Life is a stream of ohange 
but the esthetio is not a passing, fleeting thing, as/"there 
abides the deep-seated memory of an underlying harmony, the 
sense of which haunts life like the sense of being founded on a 
rook. " 
"Life grows when a temporary falling out is a tran-
sition to a more extensive balance of the energies 
of the organism with those of conditions under whioh 
1. Dewey, Art as Experienoe, p. 46. 
" .. 
it llv.s ••••• the world is full of things that are 
indifferent and even hostile to lifei the ver,r 
prooesses by whioh life is maintained tend to throw 
it out of gear with its surroundings. Ievertheless t 
if life oontinues, and in continuing it expands, 
there is an overooming of factors of opposition and 
oonflioti there is a transformation of them into 
differentiated aspects of a higher powered and more 
signifioant life ••• Here in germ are balanoe and 
harmony attained through rhythm. 2. 
The esthetic is the happiness and delight whioh comes at the 
moment of equilibrium, When the problematic situation has ar-
rived at successful and intentional adjustment of the organism 
with its environment. It is an espeoially illuminating moment 
Where the past meanings, present meaning and future meanings 
conneoted with the event add to the quiokening of the "here 
and now." 3. 
Art is a resting in the oonscious resolution of the problem-
atio. !he scientist who is also interested in this same sit-
uation, is however, interested not in the same way. The sci-
entist is interested in the resolution, but does not rest in 
it as the artist does. 4. 
there is also no difference between Fine Art and Useful 
Art. It is a distinction whioh is extrinsic to the esthetic. 
Some things whioh were once the objects of use, may now be 
museum pieces, such as the Greek vases, which were originally 
2. OR! cit •• p. 14. 
3. 
°E· cit. t p. 18. 
4. 0:2. oi t., p. 15. 
objects of every day use. Things are esthetic in the degree 
to which "the whole oreature is alive and in which he possesses 
his living through enjoyment of an 'experience' whioh will con-
tribute direotly and liberally to an expanding and rich life."5. 
When a thing is merely useful it fails to employ the whole 
creature and fails to be an "experience." ~ "experience." as 
John Dewey uses the term, is one in which the whole creature 
operates to produce an expanding and enriched life; and for a 
thing to be merely useful means that it has not used the full 
resources of man. 
"It is this degree of completeness of living in the 
experience of making and of perceiving that makes the 
difference between what is fine or esthetic in art 
and what is not. Whether the thing made is put to 
use, as are bowls, rugs, garments, weapons, is in-
trinsically speaking, a matter of indifference.7W 6. 
Art is intellec~ual in the degree to which it orders the means 
to the end. In the preceding p~ges the words, artistio, and 
esthetio have been used in connection with the description of 
"experience." Ourlanguage does not provide a word which would 
combine the two, although that would be very useful in this 
situation. Artistic refers to the production and the esthetic 
to that of perceptions and enjoyment. 7. It expresses the 
consumer's point of view rather than the producer's. 
Art is also a process of selection of the means for the 
desired end. In that sense art can never be "imitation" of the 
5. Ope C it., p. 27. 
6. Op_ Cit., pp. 26-27. 
7. OP. cit., p. 46. 
visual appearance. of things, but is a oreation Whioh must 
select signifioant phases of things and order them to suit 
the purpose of a work of art. !he process of selection is an 
interesting problem, for it requires the right seleotion of 
the means for the end in view, and is acoomplished by means of 
a prooess whioh is difficult to define, and whioh might be 
oalled "a hunch." !his "hunch" is also faoilitated by the in-
tensity of the emotion oalled out by the problematio situation. 
Bsthetio experiences are emotional, but only in the sense that 
emotion is something which oolors "experience" and is not 
something apart from it." 8., 9. 
fhe term "emotion" must be further speoified because the usual 
notion of emotion is that of something oomplete Within itself 
and the outoome of an aotion, Whereas acoording to Dewey it is 
an implioation in a situation whioh is in suspense. When the 
implioations in the suspense are great, they draw out meanings 
from the. depths of our· experiences whioh gives to the result-
ing act greater value and greater unity. 10. 
Selection ia art is from the meanings in past experiences; 
and When these are integrated with the new situation it ore-
ates the spontaneous element of the new produotion. 
"!he spontaneous in art is oomplete absorption in 
the subject matter that is fresh, the freshness of 
Whioh holds and sustains emotion. 1I What is expressed 
will be neither the past events that have exercised 
',,9. Ope oit., p. 42. 
10. Ope cit., p. 67. 
their shaping influence nor yet the literal ex-
isting oooasion. It will be, in,~the degree of 
ita spontaneity, an intimate union of the fea-
tures of present existence with values that past 
experience have incorporated in personality. Im-
mediaoy and individuality, the traits that mark 
ooncrete existence, oome from the present oooa-
sian; meaning, substanoe, oontent, from what is 
embedded in the self from the past.~ 11. 
~he qualit,y of spontaneity in the meeting of the old and the 
new is what John Dewey oalls "Intuition.~ 12. 
In this oonneotion it is also interesting to note that in his 
book: THE QUEST l!'OR CERTAINTY, p. 160, he refers to the ability 
to have an ·intuition,~ as a kind of wit whioh is even more 
produotive than thought. 
Are is not a ~truth" whioh has for its purpose use in 
other inquiries. "It is rather a signification of the integra-
tion of parts." 13. This integration of parts is what John 
Dewey oalls the "form" of an experience. 
Art is creative in the sense that the material of the na-
tural world whioh is taken by the self, is assimilated and 
returned to the world in the form of a new and individualized 
expression. This expression can also beoome a part of those 
who perceive it, when they bring to it their own funded mean-
ings of "experienoe,~ and recreate the work for themselves. 
In this sense, art is spoken of as being "universal," and is 
aohieved by means of the "form" of the work of art. 
J.J.. Ope cit., pp. 70-71.. 
12. OPe oIt., p. 266. 
15. Ope oit., p. 55. 
-"Form" 1s esthet10 when it is freed from the looal and 
limited meanings of an object and becomes the more deliberate 
unity of the organization or "design" of those elements which 
carry any event, object, soene or situation to its own in-
tegral fulfillment. 
~orm is a character of every experience that is an 
experience. Art in its speoific sense enacts more 
deliberately and fully the conditions that effeot 
unity. Form may then be defined as the operation 
of forces that carry the experience of an event, 
object, scene, and situation to its own integral 
fulfillment." 14. 
Art is, thus, that which produces a higher degree of unity in 
"Experience" and therefore gives it greater meaning. By this 
position John ~ewey maintains the consistency of explaining 
all phenomena of life as occurring within nature. Art is but 
another way of experiencing the common world and its fullness 
in a fuller and more intense way and technique becomes the 1n-
dividual discovery of the proper relationship of means and 
ends. 
While every work of art has its immediate quality, due to 
its unity; yet after this first experience of it, we are con-
scious of its larger unity with a wider sphere of reality. 
thus while being a unit, with a distinct experience of its 
own, it also has the capacity for greater meaning in the 
totality of all possible meanings. 
-We are, as it were, introduced into worlds beyond 
this world which is nevertheless the deeper rea11ty of 
14. OPe cit., p. 137. 
the world in which we live in our ordinary ex-
periences." 16. 
The esthetic experience is conveyed by the medium of "form", 
a word which implies an integration, through relations, of 
color, light, line, and space. !his is the language of art and 
is common to the various plastic Arts. A knowledge of these 
principles of art does not result in the understanding of a 
work of art, but on the other hand a work of art is more likely 
to be known if we have an intelleotual appreCiation of these 
principles. It helps to prepare the ground for understanding. 
As has been previously stated, art is not "imitation." 
That is, it does not attempt to literally reproduce the appear-
ance of things but discovers in them, elements that are suited 
to its purposes. The selection of the appropriate elements in 
things is a process of "abstraction," which appears at times to 
amount to a transformation. 
This effect is the result of its removal from its former 
context, or because certain effects are desired it may be 
"stepped up," like a "close-up" in a "mOVie." It is this fac-
tor of abstraction which makes it so difficult for persons who 
are aocustomed to natural appearanoes in things, to accept them 
in their new environment. Art, especially modern art, some-
times, looks unreal and strange to them, not to say queer. 
Some further characteristics of the esthetic form are 
continuity, cumulation, conservation, tension, and antiOipation. 
16. op. cit., p. 196. 
~he,y provoke a rhythm. of resolution and problem - and problem 
and resolution, etc. This rhythm is also a oharaoter of nature 
itself. "The terms 'natural law' and 'natural rhythms' are 
synonymous." 16. 
In this explanation of the oharaoter of an esthetio ex-
perience .here has been no mention of beauty. This is because 
Dewey considers it "properly an emotional term," 17, Whioh he 
suggests not USing, because the same idea is better expressed in 
the full explanation of ~Art as Experienoe." 
In addition to -rhythm" as an element of the esthetic, 
"balance" is a further defining oondition. ~hese two ideas are 
phases of the same organization of energies. Rhythm is "con-
oerned with movement, with oomings and goings, rather than ar-
rivals." 18. 8rmmetry (balance) is ooncerned with intervals 
that define rest and relative fUlfillment. a 19. 
Besides the facotrs already mentioned as parts of the com-
mon substanoe of art there is space-time and volume. 20. The 
arts are all one in the sense that the.y have a oommon substance. 
They are distinguished in the sense that some medium is more 
appropriate in a given experience than some other. !his factor 
permits us to speak of some experienoes as dramatic, poetio, 
arohiteotural, eto. 
~6. O~I oi t., p. 149. 
17. o~. oit. , p. 129. 
lB. O~I oit., p. 179. 
19. O~I . oi t. , p. 179 • 
20. O~I oi t., p. 213. 
"In art as an experienoe, aotua11ty and poss1bility 
or 1deality, the neW and the old, objective, mater-
ial and personal response, the individual and the 
universal, surfaoe and depth, sense and mean1ng, 
are integrated in an experience in whioh they are 
all transfigured from the significance that belongs 
to them wben isolated in reflection •• of art as ex-
perience it is true also that nature has neither 
subjeotive nor objeotive being; is neither indi-
vidual or universal, senuous nor rational. !he 
sign1f1cance of art ~ experience is, therefore, 
incomparable for the adventure of philosophic 
thought." 21. 
In regard to what 1s legitimate subject-matter for art, 
Dewey seems to think that anything Whioh is a matter of interest 
to the artist qua11f1es as being leg1timate. !he artist is 
oonditioned only by sincerity. What would give offense to 
Prudence is ins1ncere. In oonclusion 1t may be well to restate 
the fundamental conditions of art, namely, that 1t is a quality 
permeatlng experience. 
"Art ls a quality that permeates an experience; it 
ls not, save by a flgure of speech, the experience 
ltself. Esthetic experience is always more than 
esthetlc." 22. 
Summary 
1. Llfe for man is wlthin nature as experlence. 
2. Art ls a quallty that permeates experience. 
3. SClenee and Art are parts of the same problematiC sltuatlon; 
a) SClence is lnterested ln the resolutlon of the 
problem. 
b) Art rests in the resolutlon. 
4. !here ls no distinction between the ~lne and Useful Arts. 
5. !he esthetic is the happiness and delight which comes at the 
2J.. Ope cit., p. 297. 
22. Ope oit., p. 326. 
moment of equilibrium in the sucoessful termination of a 
problem. 
6. Art is intellectual as it orders means to ends that are 
planned for. It is not "truth." 
7. "Intuition" is the way in which it selects the "means." 
8. Integration of past meanings with the current problem lives 
art a spontaneous quality. 
9. Art 1s not "1m1tat1on";the process of selection is one of 
"abstraction." 
10. "Techn1que" is the discovery of the proper means. 
11. Art involves Balance, Rhythm, Space-Time and Solidity. 
12. "Form" is the name given to the unified Whole and is 
governed by principles common to all the arts. 
11. Art 1s complete within 1tself, while at the same time a 
relationship to the universal is present. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART OF JACQUES MARITAIN 
... ' .. w'f. M.IM • 
The method of explaining the Philosophy of Art of Jacques Marl-
tain will be, first, to locate it in the framework of the p~il­
osophy of St. Thomas; and then to describe its character and 
operation. For this purpose it will be well to restate that 
part of the framework of Chapter 2, which gives the location of 
art and which, in a measure, also describes its basic character. 
HOW THE INTELLECTUAL PO¥~RS OPERATE 
1. PRADTICAL ORDER 
for the'sake of something else 
What reason establishes in 
external things 
ACTION (Moraf.-i tZ) 
What reason establishes in 
the act of our Will in the 
use of our Freedom. 
The ultimate end is the first principle 
in practical matters. 
* 
2. SPECULAT IVE ORDER 
for Its own sake 
K~nds of Knowing 
1 •• aith: assent to truth as revealed by GOD. 
2. Understanding: A gift of the supernatural light in the 
immediate grasp of truth. 
3. Science: produces knowledge demonstratively by attributing 
oauses. 
In th1s ~ramework, ~rt is looated in the practioal Order as 
lIaking. 
"Art belongs to the Praotical Order. Its orienta-
tion is towards d01ng, not to the pure inwardness 
of knowledge." 1. 
"!he sphere of Making is the sphere of Art, in the 
most universal meaning of the word." 2. 
Art is divided into two kinds, .ine Arts and Useful Arts. 
!he Useful Arts are those which are done for the sake of some-
thing else. !he mak1ng of a oompass, for example, is not for 
1 ts own sake ,. but fims its justifioa tion in help1ng to keep a 
ship on its course, while .ine Art is something made for its 
own sake alone. !he Ancients did not make this distinction 
between the useful and the fine; they classed art as Servile 
and llberal. The Servile Arts were for them those whioh require 
corporal labor and the Liberal those whioh did not. Sculpture 
and painting, under this classification, were oonsidered Ser-
vile, While musio, logio and arithmetic among others were listed 
, 
as Liberal. During the medieval period the artist was simplJ 
looked upon as Artisan who worked for the common faith. !he 
Renaissance on the other hand started the movement of isolating 
the artist from the common social life of sooiety and set him 
in search of beauty as an aotivity in itself. 
o Maritain, however, has made it clear that the distinction 
between the .ine Arts and the Useful Arts is not what Logioians 
oall an "essential" diVision, but derives its character from the 
I. Jacques Karitain; Art and SOhola~ticism, p. 4. 
2. OPe cit., p. 7. 
end pur.ue4. !rt can pursue both ends at the same time. 
!he differenoe between the .ine Arts and Useful Arts is 
that the .ine Arts possess beauty. 
ART AN]) BEAUTY 
Beauty was defined by St. Thomas as that whioh gives pleasure 
on sight, i. e., joy ~ knowledge of the objeot known, not of 
knowledge. 
"It is of the nature of the beautiful that the 
~ppetite is allayed by the sight or knowledge 
of it.· 3. 
Beauty delights the mind because it possesses three faotors: 
1. Integrity, because the mind likes being. 
2. Proportion, because the mind likes order and unity. 
3. Olarity, because the mind likes intelligibility. 
"Beauty' .is the splendor of forms shining on the 
proportioned parts of matter.· 4. 
!he beautiful is not a kind of truth beoause it is con-
nected with the Lntelligibility of things; rather, it is a 
kind of good which results from a vision of the truth which i8 
a delight that produoes love. 
·-----Oontemplating the objeot in the intuition which 
sense has of it. the mind enjoys a presence, en-joys the radiant presence of an intelligibility which 
does not reveal itself to its eyes as it is.· 5. 
Beauty as has been stated before is a kind of good and not a 
kind of truth even though its operation concerns the intel-
ligible. It is a good because "the funotion of beauty is to 
3. s. !., I-II, q. 27, a. i, ad 3Um •. 
4. Ope oit., p. 26. 
5. Ope cit., p. 169. 
gratif1 des1re 1n the mind, the faoulty of enjoyment 1n the 
faoulty of know1ng." 6. 
"!he ieaut1ful and the good are the same as re-
gards the subject: they have the same founda-
tion, namely, form and the good 1s therefore 
commended as beautiful. But they differ in concept • 
• or the good, strictly speaking. regards the appe-
tite, that being good which all things desire; 
and therefore it partakes of the nature of an end, 
for the appetite is as it were a sort of movement 
to the thing. !he beautiful, however, concerns 
the force of knowledge, for things are said to be 
beautiful when they g1ve pleasure at sight---!he 
beautiful is the same thing as the good, differing 
only conceptually." 7. 
This knowledge in the object known is a matter of intuit1on. 
It is a matter of the senses and the intellect. In the matter 
of the senses it relates only to sight and hearing. B. The 
senses are a necessary part of the experience because man's 
intuition is only made possible by knowledge derived from the 
sensea. It is important to understand this matter of art as an 
intuitive experience which utilizes the senses and the intel-
lect in a manner which is not of the process of reasoning or 
thought, except secondarily. Maritain has phrased this pro-
blem with extreme clarity 1n the following quotation: 
---"!o understand this, we must conceive that it i8 
the mind and the sense combined, or, to use suoh 
an express1on, the intellectualized sense, which 
gives rise to aesthetic joy in the heart. It is 
thereby clear that the mind has no thought--unleas 
secondarily and reflectively--of abstraoting from 
sensible particulars, in the contemplation of which 
it is fixed, the intelliglble reason for 1ts joy; 
6. Ope Cit., p. ~67. 
7. OPe cit., p. 16B. 
B. Ope clt., p. 23. 
it is also olear how the beautiful oan be suoh a 
marvellous tonic for the mind, without developing 
in the least its power of abstraction or reasoning, 
and that the perception of the beautiful is ac-
companied b.Y that curious feeling of intellectual 
fullness through which we seem to be swollen with 
a superior knowledge of the object oontemplated 
though it leaves us powerless to express and possess 
it by our ideas or make it the objeot of scientific 
analysis."--- 9. 
While this last sentence would make it seem that reason can play 
no part in our comprehension, yet an explanation of the prin-
ciples in art can help to create a disposition for the enjoyment, 
although the final act of enjoyment must be a matter of "intui-
tion." 
Beauty is transcendental and tends to carry the soul be-
yond oreation in the realm of the spirit. Only some of the 
works of art make beauty their end and are called 'ine Arts as 
distinct from the Useful Arts which are for the sake of some-
thing else. 
Fine Art, however, remains in the realm of Making and the 
artist has the difficult task of selecting and arranging forms 
in matter to apprehend the transcendental quality in beauty. 
In.thts process he eliminates in many cases the irrevelant de-
tails of the visual appearances of things and exaggerates others 
in order to construct the Vision of his aesthetic intuition. 
This is always a trial for the artist as the earth bound forms 
of the objects of nature defeat, by this very fact, the pos-
sibility of doing justice to the realm of the spirit. Unlike 
9. OPe Cit., p. 162-163. 
those Who know the freedom in the joy of the contemplation of 
Wisdom, the artist suffers the knowledge of the feebleness of 
his means - matter subjected to certain rules of art. This 
furnishes a problem for the artist, for the rules are "the high 
concealed ways by which Art itself. the working reason goes 
to work, and every artist is well aware that if this intel-
lectual form ceased to dominate his matter. his art would be a 
mere sensual confusion." 10. 
"The same technique may be given to the whole 001-
lection of these rules; but on condi tion of ampli-
fYing considerably and elevating the ordinary 
meaning of the word "technique." For it is a ques-
tion not of material process only, but also. and 
chiefly, of the ways and means of proceeding in the 
intellectual sphere Which the artist uses to attain 
the end of his art. Such ways are determined, like 
paths laid out beiore through a tangled thicket. 
But they have to be discovered. And the most closely 
approximating to the individuality of the work spir-
itually conceived by the artist, art strictly per-
sonal to him and discoverable by one individual only."ll. 
A work of art is thus ·oreative" and When a given result is ob-
tained in "teohnique" as the result of disoovery it is the pro-
perty of that work only, for to repeat it in the work of another 
or in another work is to destroy it. This is the oase in What 
is oalled "aoademic art." It is this trait of "individuality· 
in the works of art whioh further alienate the artist from the 
populaoe. It sets him apart as someWhat queer because of a 
failure to speak in the oonventional term with Whioh they are 
oonversant. But the nature of a work of art sets the problem 
10. op. 0 it., p. 39. 
11. Ope oit., p. 176. 
for the artist and once he has found its solution there can be 
no oompromise even though it make him the subject of misunder-
standings. !his problem also brings us to a discussion of Art 
and Prudence. In the light of our fuller understanding of the 
demanding necessities in the production of a work of Pine Art, 
it becomes evident that the artist oannot compromise the ex-
pression of his art in the interest of Prudence. Art's only 
obligation to the rightness of the thing expressed in keeping 
with the demands of its 10gio. 
"Art, therefore, keeping Making straight and not 
Action, remains outside the line of human oonduct, 
with an end, rules, and values, whioh are not 
those of the man, but of the work to be produced. 
!hat work is everything for art,--one law only 
governs it--the exigencies and the good of the 
. work." 12. 
Skill is only a "material and extrinsio condition", as the 
rightness of a work of art resides in the logic of the work in 
the mind of the artist. 
"Art operates for the good of the work done, !! 
bonum operis. and everything Which diverts it 
from that end adulterates and diminishes it." 13. 
Because of the self-suffiCient and autocratio dominations of 
the character of a work of art, beoause the rightness of a 
work of art is in a manner of speaking non-mora1,_ there is 
often a conflict in the mind of the artist between his Art 
and Prudence. Marltain suggests that the proper reoonci1iation 
of this confliot can be brought about by a proper "humiliation" 
• Ope cit., p. • 
13. Ope cit., p. 14. 
on the part of the artist to "make him as it were unconscious 
of his art. or if the all-powerful unction of wisdom imbued 
everything in him with the repose and peace of love.- 14. 
Art, unlike Prudence, perfects the mind -Without presupposing 
the correotness of the Will.- In other words it is outslde the 
moral sphere in one sense, since as a virtue, art cannot be 
an evil. this would be a contradiction. Art as art never 
makes a mistake. 
~and therefore it ls not a necessity of art that 
the artisan work well, but that he turn out good 
work; there would, however, be a greater neces-
slty that the product of the art perform its func-
tion well, that a knife, e. g., should cut well, 
and a saw, saw well, if the pecullarity of these 
was to aot and not rather be passive, beoause they 
have no control over their acts.- 15. 
While "the 801e end of art is the work itself and its 
beauty".--, for the man working, the work to be 
done of itself comes into the line of morality 
and so is merely a means. w 16. 
While art is sovereign in its own field the artist as having 
his destiny in Beatitude is subject to morality and therefore 
his art is subject to a higher and, the final good of man. 
In a Christian there is no conflict, because what would give 
offense to man, as a Christian, and so in man himself, as a 
Christian, is resolved the possible conflict between Art and 
Prudence. 
14. 0 p. cit., p. 15. 
15. s. f •• I-II, q. 57, a. 5, ad. 1U$. 
16. OPe cit., p. 74. 
"A work of art whioh is an offense to God of-
fends him too, and having nothing left where-
with to give delight, at onoe loses in his 
eyes all reason for being beautiful." 17. 
-.aere the testimony of a poet who was sojea-
lous an artist as Baudelaire is of the highest 
interest. His essay on '!he Pagan BOhool', 
vivldly desoriblng what an error it is for a 
man to address himself to art as his supreme 
end, oonoludes as follows: '!he unoontrolled 
appetite for form impels the artist to mon. 
strous, unknown disorders. Absorbed by the 
fieroe passion for whatever is beautiful, 
coml0, pretty or pioturesque, for there are 
degrees, ldeas of What is right and true, dis-
appear; the frenzied passion for art is a 
oanoer whioh eats up everything else. And as 
the definite absenoe of what is right and true 
ln art is tantamount to the absence of art, 
the man fades away oomplete~; excessive 
speolallzation of a faoulty ends in nothlng. 
loan understand the rage of the loonoolasts 
and the Kohammedans against lmages. I admlt 
all the reoourse of St. Augustine for the 
overweening pleasure of the eyes. the danger 
is so great that loan forgive the suppression 
of the object. !he folly of art is on a par 
with the abuse of the mind. !he oreation of 
one or other of these two supremaoies begets stu-
pidity, hardness of heart and unbounded pride 
and egolsm.---" (Baudelaire, L'Art Romantique) 18. 
!his matter of Art and Prudenoe is a highly important one as oan ' 
be inferred from the previous quotation from Baudelaire, and if 
I might dlgress for a moment from the main topio of this Chap-
ter, I would like to oall attention to its relation to prao-
tioe in Art Eduoation. !here is at the present moment of 
writing quite a vogue for "self-expression" and nb~eative 
expression" ln art eauoation, as its most important product. 
17. Opt oit., p. 76. 
18. OPt olt., p. 218. 
In the light of what has been previously said on the matter of 
Art and Prudenoe it oan be easily seen that ·self-expression" 
in art oan become a potential moral evil, not so much in the 
nature of the kind of art produced, as in the fact that it is 
likely to produce eXDessive individualism, in which a child is 
taught to prize himself above any other good. In this sense 
then, the topic of Art and Prudence is a highly important 
consideration in the discipline of "self-expression", which in 
itself is not productive of evil, but is rather a necessary 
expansion of the mind in the direction of perfecting the moral 
end of human efforts. !his sin of the isolation of art from 
other values in life seems to be productive of another sin, 
the sin of vanity, in Which the artist attempts to transcend 
his earthly limitations by finding an abstraction in art forms 
that will discount all reliance on human experience as a con-
tingent charaoter of his expression, and makes his symbols of 
such purity as to be the direct informers of the transoendental 
sphere of existence. 
Since the artist is also a man as well as an artist, and 
as a man, Prudence, in the interest of his highest good, takes 
precedence over any other kind of good. And again, as a 
Ohristian, the artist, by that very fact, will not conoeive a 
good in the field of art which will not square with his highest 
good. In an age, however, which has lost in large measures 
its disoi.pline of a Ohristian life, Art has assU$ed the 
attitude of be1ng a law unto itself, and the oonf11ct of Art 
and Prudence presents a real problem. Even among the artists 
of strong .integrity the line of demarcation between these two 
interests has been d1fficult to find and even more difficult 
to keep. 
In summing up the Philosophy of Art of Jacques Maritain, 
we can say that Art 1s: 
1. Mak1ng in the Praotioal Order. 
2. Conditioned only by the good of the work 
itself and therefore outside the sphere 
of morality as a work of Art. 
3. Art is however subject to Prudence by the 
fact that while art is its own justification 
the artist as man is subject to the higher 
demands of Korality. 
4. That there are two kinds of Art 
a. Useful - for the sake of something else 
b. ~ine - for its own sake 
Fine art differs from Useful art inasmuch as 
.ine art possesses Beauty which is an end in 
itself. 
Beauty is that whioh gives pleasure on sight 
and is a kind of good which is known by a 
kind of "Intuition." !his "Intuition" i8 an 
intellectual grasp of the vision of truth as 
. 
. 
a knowledge of the splendor in truth not of 
- -
truth. !o create this beauty the artist se-
lects and arranges the forms of Visual ap-
pearances of things to conform to his ae. 
sthetic peroeption. !his is a process of !!-
straotion, which must however not deny the 
sense experienoe of things of which it is a 
part. Beauty is a kind of supernatural light 
oast on things apart from their individual 
existence, but none the less, attached to them. 
Beauty is a transcendental Which delights the 
mind because it possesses 
1. Integrity, because the mind likes being. 
2. Proportion, because the mind likes order 
and unity. 
3. Clarity. because the mind likes intelli-
gibility. 
the rules of Art are the proper ordering in the 
mind of the conditions necessary to attain the 
end of a work of art. They are the individual 
discovery of the artist as dictated by the 
needs of the work of art. They are inflexible 
and in.vi table. 
5. lastly, Art is a necessary good because it per-
fects a habit of the mind, and as such it per-
fects man in the direction of his final end 1n 
Beat1 tude. 
CHAPTBR 5 
!HI THINGS THEY HAVE IIi COMilOli 
It may seem strange, that two theories of art, one based on a 
philosophY Wholly within nature, and one which includes a des-
t1nJ beyond nature, oould have much in common. But owing to the 
faot, that art as a human achievement, has a very unique and 
distinct character of its own, it 1s possible to recognize very 
definite traits, irrespeotive of how these traits may be ac-
counted for. .or instance, both theories agree that; 
1. Art is a creation, and not an imitation of nature. 
2. Oreation involves the process of abstracting. 
3. It neoessitates "Intuition" in its production. Al-
though the oharacter of it would be described dif-
ferently in the two theories, yet in both of them, it 
has a certain "gratuitous" quality. 
4. It has ~orm"t although the definitions of it would 
be slightly different in the two philosophies. 
5. It is Intelleotual, but is not "!ruth" as such. 
6. It has an Individuality whioh is infallible in char. 
acter, being governed only by the needs of the ocoasion. 
7. It produces ~elight." 
8. S~ll is extrinsio to • work of Art. 
9. technique is a process of organizing the means toward 
the end. 
10. "Academic Art" is mere repetition of an original path 
of discovery in Art. 
11. It is a means of enlarging the intellectual horizon 
of man. 
This is quite a respectable list of oommon factors, for two suoh 
divergent philosophies to have. Among other things it indioates 
the distinotive and observable nature of Art. ~or in spite of 
the natural oonflict of these two opposing philosophies, it 
has largely sucoeeded in maintaining an independent reality of 
its ?wn, however the destiny of man may be conceived. 
CHAPTER 6 
III WHAT T~Y DIFFER 
!he two theories of art differ, as one would expect, in those 
points whioh are the immediate oonsequences of the two basio 
theories of philosophy on whioh their explanation of Art re.ts. 
1. .or John Dewey, Art is a quality that permeates "experience" 
and is wholly within nature, while fO.r Jacque. Karitain, it is 
a vision of the truth in its transoendenta1 oharacter Which is 
apprehended by and through the sensible. In this matter we 
have the most striking difference between the •• two theories of 
Art, because it reflects the most important divergence between 
the two basic philosophies on which the art theories rest. 
2. !here is also a possible disagreement about the distinction. 
of .1ne and Useful Arts. Dewey finds no cause for making such 
d1st1nction. If a thing is merely useful, it is because it 
fails in its perfection as an "experience." Ever" "experienoe" 
that is oomplete, whether it involves an objeot of use, or 
otherwise, is esthetic if it is a oomplete "experience." 
Mar1ta1n, on the other hand, divides art into two kinda, Use-
ful and .ine. !he Useful Arts being those whioh are done for 
the· sake of something else, while Fine Art is something made 
for its own sake. 
As I pointed out in a previous ohapter, I think that it is 
possible to say, that in Karitain's.philosophy, the useful 
ob~ect could have a Pine Art aspeot. For besides being made 
. 
to serve a use, the objeot might also be oonsidered as pos-
sessing a .perfection of design whioh could oonstitute an in-
terest in itself. (fine art). This interest would not nec-
essarily detraot in any way from its perfeotion as an objeot 
of use. It would· simply be s more imaginative treatment of the 
object • 
• 01' .aritain, the element whioh gives the oharaoter of 
.ine Art to Art, is "Beauty", whioh is a "kind of splendor 
shining on matter." Dewey, on the other hand, mentions Beauty, 
as being only the description of an operation for Whioh 
another term would be better, sinoe the word Beauty has too 
many mystioal oonnotations attaohed to it. He woul~ prefer to 
speak of Beauty s.imply as "Art in experienoe." 
Art and Prudenoe also present a problem to be resolved, 
as Art, whioh has no responsibility outs1de of the good of the 
work made, may use as its subjeot-matter 80mething whioh might 
be in oonfliot with the moral good of man. ~rita1n solves 
the diffioulty, by p01nting out the impossibility of suoh a 
oonfliot in an artist who 1s also a Christian, sinoe a les8er 
good (Art) oannot take preoedence over the greater good in 
the life of man (Beautitude). What would give offense to God 
in a work of Art would neoessarily give offense to the artist, 
as a Christ1an. Dewey does not speak speo1f1oally of th1s pro-
blem, exoept to 1nfer that an offense in this matter implies 
imperfectionln "experience,· and therefore oould not be an 
acoeptable resolution of a problem. 
2. IntuitIon haa been previously spoken of as an element Which 
the two theories have in oommon, subject to oertain reserva-
tions. !he common element in this situation was mentioned as 
having a oertain "gratuitous" quality. !his means that in 
both oases intuition is not the produot of an obvious effort of 
thought, but that it enters the scene as something in the na-
ture of a gift. Dewey, however, qualifies this by his re-
lianoe on the funded meaning of our previous "experiences" 
While Maritain postulates it as a gift on under stand ins. using 
this word as it has been defined in Chapter 2. 
4. !hey both speak of "delight" as one of the products of a 
work of Art, but again with a certain difference very similar 
to the one described in the preceding paragraph. 
the differences whioh have been listed in this chapter 
are irreooncilable as they are the immediate consequences of 
the two basioally different philosophies. 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
Slnce Doth of the theories of ~rt, which have been pre-
sented in the pages of this thesis are logically correct in 
themselves, final justification of them must be looked for in 
the basic philosophical foundation on Which they rest. This 
means weighing the merits of John Dewey's theory of Instrumen-
talism, with the Sbholasticism of Jacques Daritain. They are 
opposing points of view in Philosophy and they can't both be 
right. Btlenne Gilson in his book "The Unity of Philosophlcal 
Bxperiencs", page 293, defines the basic philosophy of William 
i 
James by these words: 
~l11ism James was elaborating a pragmatic concep-
tion of knowledge, where ideas were not true, but 
became true in proportion to their practical veri-
fication. " 
This description wlll also serve to define John Dewey's position 
in philosophy and his theory of art, which rests for its validity 
on this phi 10 sopq , will have to share in t.he fortunes which 
crlticism can level agalnst this philosophical point of view. 
If John Dewey's fundamental philosophy' of "lIxperianoe" is 
. 
found wanting, the same fata automatically attaches itself to 
hls'theory of art in so far as it is directly affected by it. 
Thls task of evaluation is not a simple one and could 
easily become the sUQject of another independent pleoe of re-
searoh. Sinee, however, it falls partly within the soope of 
thl. »erformance to say something about this problem, it may be 
well to sketoh one of the important feature. of suoh a orlti-
oism, as a 'basis for deciding the relative merits of the two 
art theories of this thesis. 
the ohief oritioism that oan be leveled against John Dewey' 
philosop~ of experience, is that it does not include all of 
aeality. Bo matter how satisfaotori1y one makes the explanation 
for a part of Reality, it can never stand by itself alone. At 
best, it can only' be a fool's paradise, for that part of Reality 
whioh it denies or neg1eots, will be its undoing; for the mind 
of man is so oonstituted, that 1t will not be satisfied with 
partial answerB. 
-bY his very nature man is a metaphysioa1 animal.- 1. 
~'a reason demands some answer to the questions 
-that are forced upon him ooncerning the meaning and 
purpose of life; henoe, PhilosopbT ariaes as an at-
tempt to answer the questions by going baok to the 
ultimate oauses of things. Philosophy oannot giva 
man the assurance that ravealed religion oan; out, 
whereas religion gives only the facts regarding the 
meaning and purpose of life, Phi10sophr tries to ex-
»lain them. £mong the divisions of Philosop~, 
Ketaphysics is that part whioh goes beyond all the 
material conditions of reality, by abstraoting from 
them, and derives from being-as-suoh the truth of 
Ketaphysios. then, will depend the reliability of 
all Philosophy. Soholastio KetaplV'sios i8 founded 
on Aristotle at interpreted by the thinkers of the 
)(idd1e Agas.- • 
1. Gilson; !he Unity of the Philosophioal Bxperience, p. 307. 
2. IloOormiok; Scholastio lIetapb.y8ics, Book It P. 14 • 
....... ~"-.-'-~ 
.lside from Dew.,.'. statement that W8 can know only those things 
whioh we oaD oontrol in overt aotion, he seems to find it a 
matter of further proof, that a concern with reality beyond na-
ture. is beyond the reaoh of manls knowledge beoause of the 
endless oonfusion and confliot Which suoh an effort has pro-
duoed. It does not S8em to occur to him that this confliot 
might onlY' be evidence of the difficulty of the problem, not ita 
impossibility. 
"If such is the ultimate teachings of philosophical 
e%perieDOe, the spectaole of so man, blunders. ending 
invariably in the same sceptioism, is more suggestive 
of hope than discouragement. 'ar from being a soienoe 
long sinoe exhausted, metap~sics is a soience which 
has as yet, been tried by but few. What passed by 
its name was almost always something else, and it is 
better that we know it; that is, if we are to realize 
that misadventures whioh regularly befall that some-
thing else are wholly' unrelated to the true nature 
ot metaphysios." 3. 
!he most important part of reality whioh John De.eY' exoludes 
from his philosophy is Wthe final oause. w He will admit of 
nothing except that whioh is within nature and he resolves the 
explanation of all happenings in these terma. the difficulty 
of this position is outlined in the following quotations: 
W!he existence of final causes is denied or ignored 
iy all .eohanistio philosophy. that is. by all phil-
osophy that attempts to explain reality in terms of 
mere matter and force. .inal oausality is not oap-
able of measurement in mechanical units. Its equi-
valent oannot be found in energy expended or in 
work done. Yet to omit final causality from our 
account of reality is to leave an important side of 
reality unexplained. Bfficient causes aoting on 
3. Gilson; Op. Cit., p. 318. 
matter (the orlgln of which Meohanistl0 phi1-
osoPh7 doe. not and cannot exp1aln) can alter 
matter and be a sufficient reason for the exls-
tence of new combinations of matter. But real-
lty is more than oombinatlons of matter and 
energy. In the course of the changes that take 
place in nature, single beings arrive at the per-
fection that is suitable to them and in achieving 
thls perfectlon they work out the order of the 
unlverse. Ungulded oauses cannot acoount for 8uch 
results. Unless the result aohieved was foreseen 
and lntended, we should be compelled to oall it 
acoidental; but what is accidental cannot be the 
regular and uniform effect of the worklng of a 
oaU8e. Therefore the foreseeing and lntendlng of 
an end ls necessary for the explanation of reality."4. 
hrther analysis of the philosophy of John Dewey would reveal 
m&n7 other diffioulties of his position, but for the purpose 
of this thesis, thi8 basio failure to aooount for all of Rea-
lity will have to suffice for the oonclusion, that his theory 
of £rt cannot merit the approval that can be given to that of 
Karitain's Whose basic philosophy essays the interpretation of 
the sensible world in terms of the total Reality. 
John De.8y'8 theory of Art, aside from its earthbound 
limitations, is a very complete and intriguing account of this 
subject. It is a well integrated explanation of all the con-
ditions attending a work of Art and aside from the neces8ity 
of placing it wholly with nature, with its attending conae-
quences, it bears a close resemblance to the theory of Jaoque. 
Karitain. I find John Dewey's position regarding the ~ine and 
Useful Arts, especially important for the reasons which were 
given ln Ohapter 3. All ln all, his theory of art, ln all the 
4. IOCormlok. Ope Clt., p. 157. 
I 
ramlfloationa that hls explanatlon of it takes, ls a very 11-
luminatlng and scholarly approaoh to the problem. It also has 
the merlts c of a simple and direct account, of a field whioh has 
suffered much at the hand of many phllosophers who have shrouded 
their explanations of lt in a nebulous fog of pseudo-mystical 
qualities which totally unfits it as a possibility in everyday 
living. !hey praotically deny lts benefits to all but a se-
leot few who have the leisure and the peculiaI' propensitles to 
understand and enjoy it. In this world of esthetio nonsense, 
John Dewey's polnt of view ls a welcome breath of freSh air. 
As has been stated before, John Dewey's theory of art 
suffers in explanation but not as much ln operation, except 
perhaps in regard to Pr~dence. In Maritain'. theory. the 
higher good of man, as present in the conscience of a Christian, 
would prevent the pitfalls of evil in art. In the art theory 
of John Dewey evil productions in art are subject only to the 
control of the ideals of man as founded in nature. As the dis-
cipline is entirely dependent on the moral strength and in-
tegrity of the individual, it will suffer the limitations of 
human strength. Rven in those of noble stature, in character, 
the limitations in moral strength of earth born forms will not 
prove sufficient to guide and direct the destiu, of this noble 
form of human expression. 
·Created good is not less than that good of which 
man is oapable, as of something intrinsio and In-
herent to hlm; but lt is less than the good for 
Which he is capable, as of an object. and which 
i& infinity." 1. 
~Sinoe ever" oreature is subject to the laws of 
nature, from the very faot that its power and 
action are limited; that Whioh surpasaes oreated 
nature cannot be done by the power of any crea-
ture." 2. 
It is for this reason that Maritain's theory of art in its noble 
simplioity and fullness of value must be oonsidered superior. 
1. S. !., I-II. q. 2, a. 5. 
2. S. !., I-II. q. 5. a. 7. 
John Dewey: 
John Dewq: 
John Dewey: 
John Dew.,.: 
John Dewey: 
John Dewey: 
John Dewey: 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Democracy and Education, !he Ilacmillan Co.,' 1916 
Beconstruction in PhilosoPhl, 
Ilenry Holt & Co.. 1920 
Bxperience and )Iature, 
Open Court PUblishing Co., 1925 
the Quest for Certainty, Minton Balch & 00., 1929 
Phl10s0i:i and Div1lizatlon, 
Ilnton a ch , Co., 1931 
Art as Experlence, )linton BalCh & Co •• 1934 
A Common ~alth, Yale University Pres., 1936 
Jacques Marltaln: Art and 8bholastlclsm; translated by 
J ••• Sbanlan, dharles Sbrlbner's Sons, Puo. Bew York, 1938 
Btlenne Gllson: the Unlty of Phllosophlcal B'Perience, 
Be. York: Charles Siribner's Sons, 1937 
John '. MCCormlok; BOholastic KetaphYsics, Vol. I. 
Ohlcago: 101'018 University Preaa. 198& 
!he SUmma !heoloiica of St. thomas Aquinas 
litera li translated by 
:r.thers of the lCnglish Domlnlcan Provlnee 
Burns Oatea & Washbourne Ltd. 
London, lIngland 
1922 
The thesis, itA Comparative Analysis of Two 
Philosophies of Art," written by Henry George Geilen, 
has been accepted by the Graduate School with 
referenoe to fonn. and by the readers whose names 
appear below", with referenoe to oontent. It is, 
therefore, aocepted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. 
Daniel J. Morris, Ph.D. 
Joseph Le Blanc, Ph.D. 
John McCormick.S.J. 
Joseph li1cLaughlin,S.J. 
June 8, 1938 
June 9, 1938 
June 12,1938 
June 19,1938 
